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Abstract
In this paper I elicit a prediction from structural realism and compare it,
not to a historical case, but to a contemporary scientific theory. If struc-
tural realism is correct, then we should expect physics to develop theories
that fail to provide an ontology of the sort sought by traditional realists. If
structure alone is responsible for instrumental success, we should expect sur-
plus ontology to be eliminated. Quantum field theory (QFT) provides the
framework for some of the best confirmed theories in science, but debates
over its ontology are vexed. Rather than taking a stand on these matters,
the structural realist can embrace QFT as an example of just the kind of
theory SR should lead us to expect. Yet, it is not clear that QFT meets the
structuralist’s positive expectation by providing a structure for the world. In
particular, the problem of unitarily inequivalent representations threatens to
undermine the possibility of QFT providing a unique structure for the world.
In response to this problem, I suggest that the structuralist should endorse
pluralism about structure.
Keywords: Structural Realism, Structure, Quantum Field Theory,
Pluralism, Unitary Inequivalence
1. Introduction
Broadly construed, structural realism (SR) is the thesis that our best
scientific theories tell us only about the structure of the world. This is to
be contrasted with traditional scientific realism, which attempts to find a
complete ontology of individual objects and properties in scientific theories.
Cast in this way, SR is a form of selective skepticism toward scientific theories;
we should regard theories as approximately correct about the structure of the
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world but have an attitude of skepticism toward everything they (apparently)
attribute to the world beyond structure.1
In this paper I will be concerned with two main questions. In section 2,
I will ask what SR should lead us to expect. If SR is the correct view of
scientific theories what follows? Here I will argue that SR should lead us
to expect that future scientific theories (or at least theories of fundamental
physics) will not provide an ontology of individual objects and properties as
sought by traditional realists. If it is indeed structure alone which our best
scientific theories are tracking, then we should expect ontological posits that
go beyond structure to fall by the wayside.
In section 3, the question at issue will be whether SR is vindicated. Is
there reason to think that science is developing theories that fail to provide a
traditional ontology? I will argue that there is good reason to think quantum
field theory (QFT) fulfills this expectation. Despite a concerted effort by
philosophers of physics, an ontology of individual objects and properties—of
the sort sought by traditional realists—has not been forthcoming in QFT.
This should be troubling for the traditional realist, but is just what the
structuralist expects.
SR makes a positive prediction as well: theories should provide us with
a structure of the world. Here the case of QFT is not so easily embraced by
the structural realist. In fact, QFT seems just as unable to provide us with
an unequivocal structure as a traditional ontology. After outlining several
responses to this problem, I suggest that SR may embrace a pluralism about
models to resolve the issue.
2. What structural realism predicts
2.1. Structure and success
Following Worrall (1989), SR aims to be the “best of both worlds” by
both accounting for theory change in science and providing an explanation
for the instrumental success of individual scientific theories. Much work
1Ontic structural realists such as James Ladyman and Steven French regard knowledge
of the structure of the world as in principle complete, and hence, there is no room for
skepticism on their view. Rather, the ontic structural realist takes the ontology of the
world to be fundamentally structural. This means that the correct attitude toward the
putative objects and properties recognized by traditional scientific realists is atheism, not
skepticism.
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has focused on the first component: does a commitment to only structure
allow the realist to sidestep antirealist arguments such as the “pessimistic
metainduction”? But one may also wonder how SR is able to account for
success in science.
Here the structural realist may adopt a strategy deployed by traditional
realists.
If scientific realism is to be plausible and... in agreement with ac-
tual practice, then it must go for differentiated commitments to
scientific theories, and what they entail about the world, in ac-
cordance with the evidence which supports them. (Psillos, 1999,
161)
Psillos goes on to argue that the ontological commitments of the realist
are limited to those entities responsible for the novel predictive successes used
to motivate realism with respect to some theory. This suggests a strategy—
letting the drivers of empirical success determine ontological commitment—
that may be borrowed by the structural realist with the addendum that
structure alone is responsible for empirical success. Steven French describes
this approach in his recent book:
The structuralist also focuses on the relevant success-inducing
structures presented by the theory. However, instead of taking
these to be the metaphysical outcome of properties and their
interrelations [as the traditional realist does] ... she takes these
structures themselves to be fundamental... (French, 2014, 44)
To illustrate, French uses the often discussed example of Frensel’s wave
theory of light. In this case, the structural realist argues that we should
be committed to that which is responsible for the theory’s empirical suc-
cesses, namely, Frensel’s equations and the structure they encode. Of course,
defending the structuralist’s claim that structures alone are responsible for
empirical success may prove difficult. But my intention here is more limited:
I wish to ask what follows from such a claim.
In particular, I want to highlight that for the structural realist adopting
this strategy, structure is doing all the work in our scientific theories. Re-
gardless of whether we follow Psillos’ emphasis on novel predictive success,
the structural realist must claim that structure alone is capable of accounting
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for empirical success. This is simply a result of the structuralist’s desire to
make use of the “no miracles” argument for scientific realism. If structural
realism is to provide a suitable explanation for success, then it had better be
sufficient for that in which empirical success consists. Perhaps the claim that
structure is sufficient for success is made more plausible if empirical success
is limited to novel predictive success, but this needn’t be a commitment of
structural realism. What is a commitment of structural realism is that struc-
ture alone—and not objects that may be posited over and above it—is all
that is needed to account for the empirical success of those scientific theories
worthy of belief.
Given this, it may appear as something of a mystery why some scientific
theories seem to present us with more than structure. Why, for example,
does classical mechanics seem to posit fundamental objects—in the form of
Newtonian particles—in addition to the structures provided by the theory?2
One explanation open to the structural realist is that the traditional on-
tology associated with some scientific theories plays a merely heuristic role.3
Newtonian particles, for example, might not correspond to any individual
objects in the world, but rather allow one to conceive of the structure of
the classical world. Indeed, it might prove difficult to understand and apply
a scientific theory without there being some basic ontology of objects and
properties in the context of which its claims are cast. The structural realist
can readily grant this point without being committed to the reality of such
an ontology. As an analogy, consider a mathematical structuralist who rec-
ognizes that doing arithmetic is simplified by thinking in terms of numbers
qua objects, but takes the natural-number structure as the proper subject
matter of the field.
For my purposes, it doesn’t much matter how the structural realist ac-
counts for apparent ontological posits that exceed structure in certain scien-
tific theories. Regardless of the particular explanation offered, SR views the
surplus ontology of a scientific theory as a defect, at least as far as the the-
2There are several candidate structures available in classical mechanics. One natural
choice for the structural realist is to focus on state-space structure. North (2009), for
example, argues that classical physics ascribes Hamiltonian (or symplectic) structure to
the world while, Curiel (2014) argues instead for a Lagrangian state-space structure. SR
claims that such structures—and not any objects thought to exist over and above them—
are the proper target of the realist’s ontological commitment.
3French refers to this strategy as “Poincare´’s Manoeuvre” (2014, 67).
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ory’s perspicuity is concerned. According to the structural realist, the reason
why our best scientific theories are successful is that they (more or less) accu-
rately reflect the structure of the world. Any ontological commitments that
extend beyond structure must be regarded as surplus content.
2.2. Surplus content in physics
There is a reading of the history of physics as an elimination of surplus
content. Consider, for example, the development of spacetime theories. New-
ton posited absolute space and time, but the dynamics encoded in his laws
did not require a privileged inertial frame. The empirical success enjoyed
by Newton’s theory is not the result of absolute space, because it is unal-
tered when one switches to a conception of spacetime that does away with a
privileged inertial frame (Galilean spacetime). In the next major revolution
in spacetime physics, the special theory of relativity did away with absolute
positions and times altogether. Obviously there is far more to the story, but
this rough sketch illustrates a trend toward the elimination of aspects of the-
ories that are surplus in the relevant sense; idle wheels that do no work tend
to be abandoned in future theories. Jenann Ismael and Bas van Fraassen
describe this trend as follows:
The ontologies of our most fundamental theories are not guided
by physical intuition; they are not shaped by philosophical prej-
udices, but led, at their best, by the ideal of a kind of formal
simplicity. The history of modern physics has been... ‘a long,
sustained effort to shed redundant concepts’ (Ismael and van
Fraassen, 2003, 391)
Of course, the elimination of surplus content from physical theories is not
always without costs. Scientific theories that are more sparse in their posits
may lack the resources necessary for their successful application. Returning
to the case of spacetime theories, there are two ways of understanding the
metaphysical change brought about by relativity. We may, as I suggested
above, claim that relativity eliminates positions and times and all absolute
kinematic quantitates that depend on them. Tim Maudlin, for example,
urges that “[t]o understand Relativity, we have to expunge all ideas of things
having speeds, including light”(Maudlin, 2012, 68). Yet, the common “text-
book” presentation of (special) relativity does make use of speeds and related
quantities, but relativizes them to pragmatically chosen frames of reference.
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If one is interested in applying relativity, then it is extremely helpful to in-
voke these “surplus” elements while recognizing that they are relativized to
a given context or perspective.
We are now prepared to draw a prediction. Given that non-structural
content—i.e., a traditional ontology of objects and properties—is surplus
according to SR, we should expect that it will be eliminated from the ap-
propriate ontological commitments of future physical theories. This does not
mean, however, that such elements will not play a significant role in the appli-
cation of the theory. What we should expect is that if non-structural content
is significant, it depends on the context of application or perspective of the
user in an important sense. In summary, if SR is true, we should expect
physics to develop theories in which a traditional ontology of objects and
properties is either eliminated outright or contextualized to suit particular
applications.
Before considering whether this prediction is borne out, it is worth clarify-
ing the claim being made in this section. Several familiar discussions of these
issues are cast in terms of the elimination of surplus structure rather than
surplus ontology.4 Indeed, the very case I mention—spacetime theories—
seems to be a case of the elimination of spacetime structure in the form of
a privileged inertial frame, rather than an elimination of “traditional” on-
tological elements. This may seem to count against SR insofar as the view
requires that structure is preserved across changes of theory, not eliminated.
There are two important points to consider in reply to this concern. First,
SR does not require preservation of structure across theory change, but only
continuity at the level of structure. SR claims only that theories capture
the structure of the world approximately and imperfectly, hence, it is to be
expected that our understanding of the structure of the world will be altered
by future scientific developments. The key here is that these modifications
of structure are continuous in a way that changes in traditional ontology are
not.
Second, it is not my present intension to defend SR as such, but rather to
consider an interesting prediction that follows from its truth. It is a premise
in my argument that that the history of physics reveals a trend toward the
elimination of surplus content, non-structural or otherwise. It it only when
4See, for example, Redhead (2003); Ismael and van Fraassen (2003); Baker (2010);
French (2011).
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combined with the claim that traditional ontology is surplus that it yields
the structuralist prediction. Thus, for my purposes it is enough that surplus
content tends to be eliminated, and how this impacts the structuralist’s claim
about structure preservation across theory change is an issue to be fully
addressed elsewhere.
3. What we find
Quantum field theory (QFT) provides the framework for a great many
instances of predictive success in the physics of elementary particles.5 Thus,
QFT is just the sort of theory scientific realists claim provides a (roughly)
faithful description of the world. Yet, it is not at all clear what this de-
scription is. The two most familiar ontological approaches are the particle
interpretation and the field interpretation, but both face substantial chal-
lenges.
3.1. The particle interpretation
Given that QFT provides the framework for the Standard Model of par-
ticle physics, it is natural to take the theory to be fundamentally about par-
ticles. Moreover, a common way of representing systems in QFT—the Fock
space representation—is strongly suggestive of a particle ontology. Let’s be-
gin, then, by very briefly reviewing how quantum theory represents the states
of systems.
In quantum theory, as in many contemporary scientific theories, the state
of a system is represented by a mathematical object in an abstract state-
space. To take the simplest case, a pure quantum state is represented by
a vector |ψ〉 in a Hilbert space H.6 Such a state is bestowed with physical
significance by considering the action of certain operators on this state vector.
Physical quantities (“observables”) correspond to self-adjoint operators on
that Hilbert space and the result of one of these operators acting on the
state vector provides information about potential measurement results of that
5One notable example is quantum electrodynamics (QED), which predicts the magnetic
moment of the electron with an accuracy measured in parts per billion (parts per trillion
for free electrons) (Vogel, 2009).
6In addition to pure quantum states, there are mixed quantum states, which may be
though of as statistical combinations of pure states. Mixed states cannot be represented
by a vector in Hilbert space, but can be represented by a density operator ρ on H.
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physical quantity. A Fock space is a particular Hilbert space that is used to
treat systems of “identical” particles (i.e., particles of the same kind).
Within the Fock space representation, certain states of the quantum field
correspond to different values of a number operator (Ni). The result of a
measurement of energy E or momentum p in such a state is just what one
would expect if it contained Ni particles, each with energy Ei and momen-
tum pi. These states can be modified by the so-called “creation” and “an-
nihilation” operators (a†i and ai, respectively). Unsurprisingly, the number
operator is interpreted physically as the occupation number of the system
(i.e., the number of these particles it contains) and the other operators are
associated with the creation and annihilation of particles. This suggests that
the realist about QFT should take it to describe a world of particles, or, in
Paul Teller’s terminology, “quanta.”7 Teller advocates a view in which the
state of a physical system is represented in QFT by a vector in Fock space
that is the result of “adding particles” to the empty vacuum state by the
action of the creation operator.
[O]ne can start from the idea that the world contains entities
that can be aggregated, called quanta. One can then describe
these with a Fock space and stipulate that... a collection of [cre-
ation] operators... will work to build up vectors describing exact
momentum states from the vector |0〉. (Teller, 1997, 50)
But the particles (or “quanta”) of QFT must diverge from the ordinary
conception of particles in several key respects. For example, we already knew
from non-relativistic quantum mechanics that particles cannot be localized
to a precise location, but things are worse in QFT. There are several no-go
theorems that purport to show that particles in QFT cannot be localized
to any finite region of space-time (Malament, 1996; Halvorson and Clifton,
2002). Entities that cannot be localized at all hardly seem to deserve to the
title “particles.”
Another problem arises from the Unruh effect, which predicts that an
observer accelerating uniformly when the field is in the vacuum state of the
Fock space associated with unaccelerated motion would experience a thermal
bath of particles known as Rindler quanta (Earman, 2011). Thus, from the
7Quanta are particles that can be counted or aggregated, but cannot be not labelled
or numbered. See Teller (1997, chapter 2).
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perspective of the accelerating reference frame, there would exist particles
that do not exist according to an inertial frame. Yet, given that QFT is a
relativistic theory, we should expect its fundamental ontology to be invariant
under changes of reference frame. Surely what there is shouldn’t depend on
whether one is accelerating or not.
Finally, even if these problems can be overcome, the Fock space repre-
sentation used to describe non-interacting quantum fields cannot easily be
extended to deal with interacting quantum fields such as the quantized elec-
tromagnetic and electron fields whose interactions are described by quantum
electrodynamics. In particular, Haag’s theorem shows that there are no Fock
space representations available for interacting quantum fields that can be re-
garded as equivalent to the Fock space that would be appropriate if they
did not interact (Earman and Fraser, 2006).8 This suggests that in describ-
ing interacting quantum systems—and there are no truly “free” systems in
nature—one cannot appeal to a notion of countable particles or quanta.
Obviously, there is more to be said about the role of particles in the
interpretation of QFT, but clearly the particle interpretation faces serious
challenges. This leads one prominent philosopher of physics to pronounce
that “[t]he notion that quantum field theory (QFT) can be understood as
describing systems of point particles has been all but refuted by recent work
in the philosophy of physics” (Baker, 2009, 585).
3.2. The field interpretation
Perhaps, then, we are better off regarding QFT as a theory describing
physical fields, that is, a collection of properties attributed to spacetime re-
gions. But, while QFT can be understood as describing fields, they are
operator-valued fields—an assignment of operators to regions of spacetime.
As Teller (1997) emphasizes, operators in quantum theory are associated
with determinables rather than determinates and a distribution of the for-
mer seems ineligible as a fundamental ontology for QFT. Consider, as a toy
example, temperature. We might take the temperature in this room to be a
field comprised of a property tx associated with each location x in the room.
Notice that in this case associated with each point in space is a determinate
(tx) of the same determinable (temperature). At most, what an operator-
valued field seems to provide, however, is an attribution of determinables to
8More carefully, these Fock spaces are unitarily inequivalent in the sense defined in
section 3.4.
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locations, e.g., temperature associated with location x. It’s hard to un-
derstand what it would mean for the world to consist of a spatiotemporal
distribution of determinables, but it certainly wouldn’t qualify as a physical
field in the usual sense.
What’s more, Baker (2009) argues that the problems that confront the
particle interpretation mentioned above carry over to the field interpretation
as well. The best developed version of the field interpretation represents the
state of a system by a wave-functional ψ[φ(x)], a function that maps classical
field configurations φ(x) to probability amplitudes (Huggett, 2000). Impor-
tantly, the Hilbert spaces in which these wave-functionals “live” are formally
equivalent to Fock space, which lends the field interpretation much of the
plausibility of the particle interpretation. But unfortunately, this equiva-
lence also means that the wave-functional approach inherits the problems
of the particle interpretation outlined in the previous section. In particu-
lar, the alternative representations of the Unruh effect and the difficulties in
representing interactions carry over to the field interpretation.
3.3. The “scandal” of QFT
These remarks merely scratch the surface of the debate over the ontology
of QFT, but they suffice to make the following observation. The difficulties
associated with the ontology of QFT stand in stark contrast to the success
of physicists in applying it. What results is nothing less than a “scandal” for
scientific realists (Ruetsche, 2011, §15.1): the very theories for which we have
best reason to let guide our understanding of reality are seemingly unable to
provide such guidance.
Of course, one way to respond to the scandal is to abandon the aims of
realism in the context of QFT. If QFT is not in the business of describing
the world, then it is no mystery why commentators have struggled to find in
it a suitable ontology. Richard Healey, for example, argues that QFT does
not make “descriptive claims about physical reality” but instead serves to
“advise an agent on the scope and limitations of descriptive claims it may
make in a given situation” (2012, 731–732) and a broadly similar position is
taken by Quantum Bayesians (Fuchs, 2010; Caves et al., 2007).9
9A key difference between these two approaches is that Healey’s pragmatism, unlike
Quantum Bayesianism, claims that QFT enables us to make objectively true claims about
quantum states and probabilities, with the crucial qualification that neither states nor
probabilities attempt to represent elements of physical reality. Nevertheless, to the extent
10
The structural realist has a different take on the scandal. The reason
the traditional realist approach—interpreting the mathematical formalism of
QFT in terms of a fundamental ontology of objects and properties—fails is
not a problem with realism, but a problem with the traditional approach to
it. If we abandon the search for a traditional ontology appropriate to QFT,
the scandal is avoided. Indeed, for the structural realist, the failure of QFT
to provide such an ontology might be seen as a vindication of the prediction
made above. Physics seems to has given the structuralist just what she was
looking for: a successful scientific theory free of ontological baggage.
Laura Ruetsche (2011) draws a different moral from the issues surround-
ing the ontological interpretation of QFT.10 Ruetsche’s coalescence approach
argues that “the uses to which theories are put have a hand in determining
the content of those theories” (Ruetsche, 2011, 288). In terms of the de-
bate above, the upshot of this approach is that there are contexts in which
a particle interpretation applies and others to which a field interpretation is
better suited. The coalescence approach obviously does not sit well with the
traditional understanding of scientific realism, which seeks to derive a single
ontological picture from our best theories.
From the perspective of SR, however, the situation may be seen as roughly
analogous to the spacetime theories mentioned above. Just as relativity the-
ory may be seen as relativizing certain kinematic quantities to a pragmati-
cally chosen reference frame, so too is our ontological interpretation of QFT
relativized to the context in which it is applied. In both cases there is an
underdetermination of representations; there are multiple ways to model the
same situation. This underdetermination is resolved by adopting a partic-
ular representation on the basis of practical considerations. In the case of
relativity, this means choosing a reference frame that is convenient for some
particular application of the theory. The structural realist can claim that
different representations in QFT (e.g., a given Fock space or wave-functional
space representation)—and their ontological interpretations in terms of par-
ticles or fields—are similarly underdetermined. Thus, the same moral applies
to these representations, namely, that the relativized elements they contain
are artifacts of our representation rather than genuine features of the world.
that the realist requires the success of QFT to be grounded in a description of the world
provided by the theory, neither approach is acceptable.
10Ruetsche’s target is not QFT as such, but rather quantum theories dealing with sys-
tems that have infinite degrees of freedom (QM∞) of which QFT is an instance.
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This means that even on Ruetsche’s coalescence approach, it remains the
case that QFT fails to provide a single, context-independent (traditional)
ontological picture, just as SR would lead us to expect.
3.4. The problem of inequivalent representations
Unfortunately for the structural realist, the analogy with spacetime theo-
ries can only be taken so far. Crucial to our understanding of relativity theory
is the idea that content expressed in different reference frames is physically
equivalent ; different frames offer different representations of the same situa-
tion. If this analogy is to be extended to QFT, it seems the structural realist
must regard the particle and field interpretations as also equivalent. That
way the structural realist can be as sanguine about the adoption of a par-
ticular ontology as she is about adopting a given reference frame. But, by
the usual standard of equivalence in quantum theories, the different Hilbert
space representations deployed in QFT fail to be equivalent.
In order to understand the problem it is necessary to understand two
senses in which Hilbert spaces may be properly called “representations.”
Thus far, I have been referring to Hilbert spaces as representations in so far
as they are used to model a particular physical system, for example, a free
(non-interacting) electron. In order for a Hilbert space to serve as a suitable
state-space for quantum theory, though, it is a further requirement that the
operators defined on it must conform to certain rules. These rules take the
form of relations between operators, such as the following relation between
position (x) and momentum (p): [x, p] = i~. These rules are known as the
Canonical Commutation Relations (CCRs), or, in more general form, the
Weyl relations. When the operators on a Hilbert space conform to the these
relations, we say that it is a representation of the CCRs. Thus, all Hilbert
spaces used to represent systems in quantum theory are also representations
in this latter sense.
The question now before us is when two representations of the CCRs
are physically equivalent. Intuitively, a promising answer is that we must
be able to transform one representation to the other via an operation anal-
ogous to a change of reference frame in relativity. The standard candidate
for such an operation in quantum theory is a unitary transformation, and
hence, the standard criterion for physical equivalence is unitary equivalence.
Two representations pi1, pi2 of an algebra of operators A in Hilbert spaces
H1, H2 (respectively) are unitarily equivalent iff: Upi1(A) = pi2(A)U for a
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certain unitary map (a one-to-one, linear, norm-preserving transformation)
U : H1 → H2 and all A ∈ A.
This criterion has the welcome result that all Hilbert space representa-
tions of the CCRs in non-relativistic quantum theory are equivalent (a result
established by the Stone-von Neumann theorem), but this is no longer the
case when we consider systems with infinite degrees of freedom as in QFT.
This gives rise to the problem of unitarily inequivalent representations: QFT
provides multiple irreducible and inequivalent Hilbert space representations.
The presence of unitarily inequivalent representations gives rise to two
related problems. First, what seems to be the same physical situation can
be represented in a number of unitarily inequivalent ways. For example, in
the Unruh effect mentioned above, the accelerated and inertial frames cor-
respond to unitarily inequivalent representations of the CCRs. This leads
to uncertainty about which of them captures the actual state of the world.
Second, inequivalent representations are deployed in different contexts. As
noted above, free and interacting quantum fields require inequivalent repre-
sentations, and hence, it becomes difficult to apply a single interpretation
of QFT across different contexts. To summarize, unitarily inequivalent rep-
resentations give rise to two sorts of worries: an underdetermination worry
and a lack of common representation worry.
The problem for the structural realist is that these unitarily inequivalent
representations each seem to attribute a different structure to the world. A
unitary transformation is an isomorphism between Hilbert spaces, so it’s hard
to see how there could be any notion of “shared structure” without it. This
means that many of the difficulties raised above for the particle and field
interpretations seem to face the structural realist interpretation as well. As
Ruetsche puts the problem, “the collection of significant successes enjoyed by
theories of QM∞ defy attribution to a single type of structure”11 (Ruetsche,
2011, 348). Thus, we might conclude that QFT is exactly the wrong sort of
theory from the perspective of SR; it is equivocal not only about traditional
ontology, but also about the structure it ascribes to the world.
Without a compelling reply to the problem of unitarily inequivalent repre-
sentation, SR loses out to antirealist and non-representationalist approaches
to QFT. After all, those approaches may also predict that contemporary
11QM∞ is the class of quantum theories dealing with systems that have infinite degrees
of freedom of which QFT is an instance.
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physical theories will fail to provide a traditional ontology. SR is distin-
guished from such views by its positive expectation that our best theories
are capable of capturing the structure of the world, and hence, this claim
must be defended from the challenge of unitarily inequivalent representa-
tions. In the next section I will briefly consider several general strategies the
structural realist may deploy toward this end. I hope to motivate a reserved
optimism about the prospects for defending SR in the context of QFT.
Before turning to that task, let’s quickly take stock. We began by draw-
ing a prediction from SR: If structure is doing all the work and traditional
ontology is surplus, and if physics tends to eliminates surplus elements over
time, we should expect to physics to develop successful theories which lack
a traditional ontology of objects and properties. QFT, in light of the deep
problems facing its fundamental ontology, may be taken to be a candidate
for such a theory. In this sense, QFT may be taken to vindicate the purely
negative prediction just mentioned. The structural realist cannot rest con-
tent with this result, however, for at least two reasons. First, other accounts
share this negative prediction. The same argument could be deployed by an-
tirealists of various stripes, who could claim that only the empirical content
of scientific theories is significant, and hence, we should expect successful
theories to emerge for which no single ontological interpretation is tenable.
Second, to the extent that SR is a version of realism, it must be committed
to a positive claim concerning what theories can tell us about the world.
This positive expectation is that empirically successful theories will tell us
about the structure of the world. Inequivalent representations are a problem
because they seem to undermine the positive expectation of SR.
3.5. Replies
3.5.1. Three extant strategies
The problem of unitarily inequivalent representations for SR is the result
of three key claims:
1. The structure attributed to the world by QFT is given by a Hilbert
space representation.
2. There are unitarily inequivalent representations.12
3. Unitary equivalence is necessary for physical equivalence.
12It is a further requirement that each representation is irreducible: it does not contain
a subset capable of representing the CCRs on its own.
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It follows from these claims that QFT provides us with physically inequiv-
alent structures, a conclusion which seems at odds with SR. Three general
strategies of response, naturally, correspond to the denial of each of these
three claims.
The first strategy rejects that Hilbert space representations are the proper
sources for the physical content of QFT. Recall that each Hilbert space is a
representation of the CCRs (or Weyl relations) in that the operators on it
(which represent physical quantities) must conform to these relations. This
means that, despite their unitary inequivalence, distinct representations do
share some features. In particular, if we consider only those operators fixed
by the relations, which form the Weyl algebra, these will be common to
every representation. There is a large contingent of philosophers working on
QFT who argue that such algebras are of primary importance—those who
favor Algebraic QFT (see Halvorson and Mu¨ger, 2007)—which suggests that
perhaps the realist should limit her commitments to the shared Weyl algebra.
If our aim to is find a structure that is shared among unitarily inequiva-
lent representations, and we are inclined toward taking algebras of operators
to be of particular importance, a natural suggestion emerges: the real struc-
ture QFT attributes to the world is given by the Weyl algebra of operators,
which may be represented in different ways. Inequivalent representations, on
this view, are nothing more than different depictions of the same underlying
structure. Thus, the “Algebraic Imperialist” seeks to avoid the problem by
limiting her ontological commitment to that which is common among rep-
resentations; anything beyond the Weyl algebra of operators is regarded as
devoid of physical content.
While such an approach can respond to the problem of unitarily inequiv-
alent representations, it is seen by some as throwing the baby out with the
bathwater. Laura Reutsche (2002; 2011) argues that by only recognizing
the algebra of operators common to all representations, the Algebraic Im-
perialist lacks the resources to account for all of the empirical successes of
QFT. In particular, cases such as spontaneous symmetry breaking and phase
transitions in quantum statistical mechanics seem to require taking as physi-
cally significant operators associated with inequivalent representations. This
worry is familiar from spacetime case mentioned above: if we eliminate all
“surplus” content we may be left with too few resources for the theory to
capture all of the phenomena.
David Wallace (2011) has urged that the algebraic approach to QFT,
despite its popularity among philosophers, is the wrong way to think about
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QFT. Instead, he argues that we should focus on the “conventional” La-
grangian version of QFT deployed by many physicists. Importantly, Wallace
takes this theory to include “cutoffs” that limit its application to systems
with only finite degrees of freedom. Recall that in non-relativistic quantum
theory the problem of unitarily inequivalent representations does not arise
because the Stone-von Neumann theorem ensures the equivalence of all of
the relevant Hilbert space representations. This is usually taken to fail in
QFT because the degrees of freedom associated with a field in spacetime are
infinite, but if we limit the theory to systems of finite degrees of freedom,
the theorem can be resorted. Thus, for Wallace, the problem of inequivalent
representations does not arise because all representations of the CCRs are
unitarily equivalent.
The greatest challenge facing Wallace’s approach is that Lagrangian QFT,
while perhaps fine for working physicists, has features that make it unattrac-
tive as a philosopher’s guide to the world. Imposing cutoffs only seems justi-
fied if we are really dealing with finite systems, but for a field in spacetime to
have a finite number of degrees of freedom seems to require that spacetime
itself is both finite and discrete (Fraser, 2009). To avoid these consequences,
Lagrangian QFT must be viewed as an “effective field theory” that is only
applicable within a given energy scale and, thus, it can at best tell us what
the world is like at that energy scale. In other words, this understanding
of QFT prevents the realist from being able to say what the world is really
like at the most fundamental level. Whether this is a suitable position for a
realist to take toward QFT remains to be seen.
A final strategy denies that unitary equivalence is required for physical
equivalence. Above, the requirement was motivated by the intuition that
unitary transformations play an analogous role to reference frame changes
in relativity; both implement “changes” that make no physical difference.
The general term for transformations that, like these, map solutions into
physically equivalent ones are symmetry transformations. But, as David
Baker argues, “since symmetries can fail to be unitarily implementable...
unitary equivalence is not necessary for physical equivalence” (2011, 146). In
essence, what Baker argues is that the presence of a symmetry mapping and
unitary inequivalence come apart, and hence, it is the former rather than the
latter that should be taken to establish physical equivalence. The (structural)
realist, then, may claim that unitarily inequivalent representations needn’t
be a problem so long as there is a symmetry mapping between them. Indeed,
French suggests that the structural realist can “appeal to Baker’s condition
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to assert the intertranslatability of representations” in just this way (2012,
133).
Unfortunately, it’s not clear that Baker’s condition—the existence of sym-
metry mapping—can be put to the use French suggests. The formal defini-
tion of symmetry13 that Baker deploys only relates the operators in the Weyl
algebra (those shared by all representations); once we include other opera-
tors (which differ between representations) all bets are off. Of course, one
could limit commitment to only the Weyl algebra, but this is to endorse
Algebraic Imperialism, a position whose costs have already been reviewed.
If the physically significant structure provided by a representation exceeds
the shared algebra of operators, then there is no reason to think that the
existence of a symmetry mapping between representations establishes their
physical equivalence (Baker, 2011, 147).
While each of these strategies remains a live option for the structural
realist to pursue, each faces substantial challenges as well. Thus, it is worth
considering whether there are other options available. In the next section I
will consider a reply that attempts to embrace the three claims that generate
the problem while maintaining SR.
3.5.2. Pluralist SR
This final strategy of reply takes inspiration from a remark in Don Howard’s
discussion of the problem of unitarily inequialvent representations for SR.
If the structuralist is committed to the view that theory affords
a unique structural representation of nature, and if the algebraic
point of view is the right point of view in QFT, the structuralist
has a problem. My own view is that structuralism should never
have committed itself to a uniqueness claim in the first place. But
then, I am not a structuralist. So I have no right to an opinion.
(Howard et al., 2011, 231)
Howard may not be a structuralist, but it is worth considering whether
the structural realist can drop the uniqueness claim he alludes to. Per-
haps the way to save SR is to embrace the pluralism of Ruetsche’s coalesced
structures approach within a structural realist framework. Ruetsche suggests
13A symmetry is defined as an automorphism of the Weyl (C∗) algebra T : A → A that
preserves all expectation values.
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that different contexts require different, inequivalent versions of QFT. This
view is unacceptable for the traditional realist in so far as it is committed
to contextually-determined incompatible ontologies of the world. But is it
equally incompatible with SR?14
To begin, it is worth noting that there are varieties of pluralism that
are compatible with traditional realism. Anjan Chakravartty (2011), for
example, argues that pluralism about the metaphysical nature of objects and
about how dispositions of objects manifest themselves are both compatible
with scientific realism. But, such pluralism won’t help in this context. The
central issue in the interpretation of QFT is that there are no candidates
for the fundamental objects the theory describes, not ambiguity about their
nature or the powers they manifest.
Similarly for SR, the kind of pluralism that is needed is not merely plu-
ralism about the features of structures or how they are represented, but
pluralism about which structures constitute our most fundamental descrip-
tion of reality. This is particularly relevant in considering a kind of pluralism
that emerges in connection with the version of SR developed by Ladyman
and Ross (2007). Ladyman and Ross develop an ontic version of SR where
structures consist of “real patterns” (Dennett, 1991). As Dennett himself
emphasizes, it is a feature of such patterns that there can be several seem-
ingly incompatible patterns present in the same collection of data. However,
this version of pluralism is not easily applied to the present case in so far as
it requires an underlying level of “data” in which the plurality of patterns is
to be located.15
While it may be possible for the (epistemic) structural realist to posit an
underlying non-structuralist ontology which supports the presence of multiple
structures, the structuralist looking to QFT as a guide to fundamental reality
will be unhappy with such an approach. Fortunately, there is another way
14French (2012; 2014) also asks this question and, as I will below, answers in the negative.
His reconciliation differs from mine in that he emphasizes “structural features of QFT
that cut across different representations” (2014, 323). On the pluralist view I suggest,
by contrast, the inequivalent structures provided by QFT serve as our most fundamental
description of physical reality. Thus, the pluralist structuralist does not seek to find a
larger structure in which these inequivalent structures may be embedded, but rather, is
content with a plurality of irreducible and inequivalent structures.
15Ladyman and Ross deny the claim that real patterns require underlying data. For
them, “it’s real patterns all the way down.” (Ladyman and Ross, 2007, 228)
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for the structural realist to embrace pluralism about structure.
The key to this view is to appreciate that SR, like any plausible form of
realism, takes the knowledge of the world provided by science to be incomplete
and approximate. Hence, no theory should be viewed as providing a perfectly
accurate picture of the world. In the case of SR, this means that the structure
of theoretical models should not be taken to capture the structure of the world
exactly, but only approximately and/or incompletely.16 This looseness of
match allows the structural realist to regard different structures as capturing
different aspects of the structure of the world. Even seemingly incompatible
structures may in fact be compatible with a single fundamental reality if they
are less than perfectly accurate pictures of it.
Dennett emphasized that multiple real patterns—even seemingly incom-
patible ones—can be present in a single data set. Similarly, the structural
realist can allow for a theory that attributes multiple structures to the world
by taking them to capture the world’s structure only approximately and in-
completely. Just as Dennett notes that the presence of noise in real patterns
doesn’t weaken their claim to reality, so too can a pluralist version of SR
claim that the structures provided by a such theory reveal genuine aspects
of the world’s structure in spite of their limited accuracy. Applied to the
case of QFT, the pluralist may regard unitarily inequivalent representations
as each describing different structures that are really present in the world,
while none of them, taken individually, provides the complete, exact structure
of the world.
Recall the two aspects of the problem of unitary inequivalence for SR:
underdetermination and lack of common representation. An example of the
first sort of worry is provided by the Unruh effect, where the Minkowski
and Rindler representations offer unitarily inequivalent descriptions of the
vacuum state. The pluralist structural realist will allow that both represen-
tations capture aspects of the structure of the situation, even though neither
should be taken to be giving us the structure. Each representation provides
us with a structure that approximates (parts of) the structure of the world,
but we cannot know where the inaccuracies lie, for doing so would require
unmediated access to the structure of the world.
The second worry is that (as a result of Haag’s theorem) free and in-
16One way to make precise this notion of approximating the structure of the world is
the partial isomorphism approach developed by da Costa and French (1990, 2003).
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teracting quantum fields require inequivalent representations. This is an
instance where context is of particular importance. In the context of cer-
tain applications—say, scattering experiments17—it is useful to deploy mod-
els which describe interacting fields, while in other contexts a free quantum
field model may suffice. Here the pluralist version of SR can claim that
the structure of the world is exhibited in different ways by free and inter-
acting quantum systems. It is not that the structure of the world itself is
context-dependent, but rather that it manifests itself differently in different
contexts. Thus, the pluralist can allow for context to determine the appro-
priate representation—and the structure it carries with it—so long as each
structure matches the world only “loosely.”
At this point, one might wonder whether this pluralist version of SR still
deserves the title of “realism.” After all, on this view we cannot say what the
fundamental structure of the world is, but only that it is approximately and
incompletely like those structures QFT deploys in its models. Yet, I contend
that pluralist SR preserves a key attribute of scientific realism: accounting for
empirical success. The same argument used by traditional realists—the “no
miracles” argument of Putnam (1975)—can be deployed by the structural
pluralist; the reason QFT is so successful is that its models capture how
the world really is.18 Of course, they do so imperfectly, but, to repeat, any
plausible realist position must make this concession in light of the history of
theory change in science.
Poincare´ had a view according to which science was capable of revealing
only the relations between things, as expressed in mathematical equations,
and not the nature of those things. The most we can hope for is that the
equations of a theory match the relations between things in the world; any
content beyond these relations is mere window-dressing. His view has many
affinities with contemporary SR and his remarks on reconciling inconsistent
17In fact, scattering experiments typically involve the application of both free and in-
teracting models. The “in” and “out” states are represented as states of free fields, while
the fields are treated as interacting where the particles are scattered. Such a plurality of
models fits well with pluralist SR, which claims that each model (imperfectly) captures
aspects of the structure of the situation.
18Not everyone is convinced by this style of argument, of course. My point is simply that,
to the extent that the argument is successfully deployed by traditional realism, pluralist SR
can also make use of it. One important challenge for advocates of the argument is to say
how approximate truth—or approximate isomorphism—is sufficient for success (Laudan,
1981, 30–32), but pluralism does not introduce any special difficulties here.
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theories are particularly apt.
When a physicist finds a contradiction between two theories equally
dear to him, he sometimes says: “We will not bother about that,
but hold firmly the two ends of the chain, though the intermedi-
ate links are hidden from us.” This argument of an embarrassed
theologian would be ridiculous if it were necessary to attribute
to physical theories the sense the laity give them. In case of con-
tradiction, one of them at least must then be regarded as false.
It is no longer the same if in them be sought only what should
be sought. May be they both express true relations and the con-
tradiction is only in the images wherewith we have clothed the
reality. (Poincare´, 1913, 142)
Poincare´ makes two points that are relevant to pluralist SR. First, he
claims that contradictory theories may be reconciled if we focus on “what
should be sought”—that is, relations between things or structure. The most
obvious way this could occur is if the theories agree about structure and
disagree only in the way this structure is dressed-up. The pluralist claims
that even when those theories (models) disagree about structure they may
be rendered compatible by taking them to capture the world’s structure only
incompletely and approximately. Second, Poincare´ claims that inconsistent
theories may each express true relations. As I claimed above, in order for SR
to appeal to the “no miracles” argument for realism, theories (models) must
share structure with the world, even if the match is imperfect. This is not
inconsistent with them “expressing true relations” so long as they express
those relations only approximately or only express some of them.
In contrast to pluralist SR, consider a traditional realist position that
accepts genuine pluralism about fundamental ontology. Such a view is unable
to account for predictive success in the same manner as pluralist SR. If our
fundamental theory—in this case QFT—is equivocal on what the ontology
of the world is, then it cannot be successful in virtue of describing that
ontology, even approximately. For the traditional realist, it is only once
we have settled what the fundamental ontology is that there is room for
pluralism about the nature of that ontology (a` la Chakravartty). Thus, the
structural realist can embrace a robust pluralism that the tradition realist
cannot; structurally inconsistent models can be taken to be approximately
isomorphic to the world, but ontologically inconsistent models cannot be
taken to be approximately true in the same way.
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This is simply a synchronic application of the argument SR deploys di-
achronically in the context of theory change. In the latter case, SR urges
that despite discontinuity at the level of traditional ontology, scientific theo-
ries exhibit significant continuity of structure. This allows the structuralist
to claim that earlier theories (e.g., Frensel’s ether theory of light) and later
theories (e.g., Maxwell’s electromagnetism) are both approximately true in
so far as they both capture the structure of world, more or less. This option is
not obviously available to the traditional realist. If truth for the traditional
realist requires getting the ontology of the world right, then, when earlier
theories differ from later ones in their ontological commitments they cannot
both be true, even approximately so. This is, of course, a point made con-
vincingly by Larry Laudan (1981). Turning to the synchronic case, the same
considerations seem to show that traditional realism cannot regard ontolog-
ically inconsistent theories as both true, even approximately so. And again,
the structuralist may claim a different result: structurally distinct theories
may each approximate the structure of the world.
I hope to have shown that pluralist SR is a viable form of realism. If
that’s right, then there is another solution to the problem of unitarily in-
equivalent representation in QFT. Even if we grant that different Hilbert
space representations ascribe different structures to the world, we may nev-
ertheless take them each to be (approximately and incompletely) getting at
the structure of the world. I don’t claim that pluralist SR is required to
the solve the problem—it is quite possible that one of the strategies out-
lined in section 3.5.1 will pan out—but it makes inequivalent representations
less threatening than they appear to be at first glance. In fact, it may now
seem that unitarily inequivalent representations make QFT just the theory
structural realists were hoping for.
4. Conclusion
The testing of SR requires the consideration of not only historical cases,
but also contemporary and future ones. I have argued that SR leads to the
expectation of empirically successful theories, now or in the future, that do
not posit a traditional ontology of objects and properties. The argument
has two main steps. The first is to note that SR takes structure alone to
be responsible for the empirical success of a scientific theory, and regards as
surplus those aspects of theories that go beyond structure. The second is the
observation of a general tendency in physics to eliminate surplus elements
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that fail to contribute to the empirical success of the theories in which they
occur. Together, these lead to the expectation of theories without traditional
ontological commitments.
I claim that QFT is plausibly such a theory. While it has an unassail-
able record of empirical success, questions over its ontological commitments
remain vexed. Both particle and field interpretations face major challenges,
which creates a problem for traditional realism. If a theory is successful in
virtue of faithfully describing the world, then a successful theory from which
no such description is forthcoming is worrying. Thus, QFT seems to vin-
dicate SR’s expectation for an empirically successful theory lacking a single
traditional ontology. Yet, SR also makes a positive demand, namely, that
theories should tell us about the structure of the world. It is in the context
of this expectation that the problem of unitarily inequivalent representations
occurs. The presence of such representations seems to show that QFT as-
cribes inequivalent structures in different contexts, or sometimes even in the
same context. Several strategies of reply to this problem were considered
and another was added: pluralist SR. According to the pluralist, each rep-
resentation is successful in virtue of getting at the structure of the world,
albeit in a necessarily incomplete and approximate manner. Pluralist SR
offers a promising alternative to the other strategies of reply and thereby
positions the structuralist better with respect to the problem of inequivalent
representations.
So is SR vindicated in its prediction? Ultimately the answer depends
on the status of debates in the interpretation of QFT. If the question of its
fundamental ontology is hard, but ultimately soluble, then QFT fails to meet
he negative expectation of SR. It is possible, of course, that the particle or
field interpretation (or some other traditional ontological interpretation) is
ultimately correct, but the current state of the debate suggests otherwise.
Another possibility is that QFT may be superseded by a more complete the-
ory (e.g., one that includes a theory of quantum gravity). If this successor
theory clearly does provide a traditional ontology, this would present a dif-
ficulty for SR, while not necessarily a refutation of the view. In this case,
the structuralist would be surprised that physics developed a theory that
reintroduces traditional ontological posits when it is unnecessary to do so,
but she might attempt to dismiss them as merely heuristic devices. At any
rate, it wouldn’t change the fact that physics does provide, in QFT, a theory
of just the sort SR leads us to expect.
The general point is that SR allows for—indeed, recommends—theories
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whose only ontological commitments are structural, while the traditional re-
alist must require substantially more. This lowering of the ontological bar
illustrates one sense in which SR makes a concession to the antirealist. It
also allows the structuralist to come closer to the attitude of those working
physicists who see QFT as a exemplary, rather than defective, scientific the-
ory. If the current trajectory of physics is maintained, it seems unwise to
hope for theories capable of an ontological interpretation of the sort required
by traditional realism. This suggests that scientific realists would do well to
embrace SR as their best hope for realism going forward.
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